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Abstract
This paper examines the financial policies and balance sheet adjustment of com-
panies. Using a large panel of quoted UK firms, we estimate models for dividends,
new equity issuance and investment, relating them to debt adjustment. The results
suggest that while dividends are sticky in the short run, they are an important
means of balance sheet adjustment in the long run. Other evidence supports the
idea that companies actively target their balance sheet by variation in dividends,
new equity issues and investment. There is evidence for financial pressure effects of
debt-servicing costs on investment and dividends but not new equity issuance.
JEL Classification: G35, C23, E52.
Key Words: Financial pressure; dividends; equity issues; debt; investment; com-
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1 Introduction
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958), the role and importance of corporate financial
policies has been the subject of widespread controversy. This reflects the variety
of issues where corporate financial behaviour is relevant, including corporate tax
policy, the possible role of the financial system in encouraging capital investment,
the relationship between company debt and financial stability, and the impact of
monetary policy on corporate spending.
The present study examines the empirical determinants of dividends, equity
issuance and investment among UK firms. It considers how financial pressure affects
companies and how companies adjust their balance sheets in the light of this. This is
important in analysing the transmission of financial shocks throughout the economy.
In particular, we consider how outcomes at the company-level—both financial and
real—are related to the financial pressure of debt-servicing. An important focus of
our analysis is on the relative importance of balance sheet adjustment via financial
policies, notably dividend distributions and new equity issuance, compared to that
occurring through real investment decisions. This extends the analysis of Nickell and
Nicolitsas (1999) who consider how financial pressure affects a number of other firm-
level outcomes, employment, wage growth and productivity, but do not consider
financial policies nor fixed investment outcomes.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical background
to the paper, in terms of the resolution of balance sheet pressures by various means.
Section 3 contains data description and estimation of models for the level of debt,
the level of dividend payment, the propensity to issue new equity and rates of
investment of a panel of 2,062 UK firms. Section 4 concludes.
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2 Economic background: The resolution of bal-
ance sheet pressures
Whatever their motivation, all corporate financial decisions are bound together by
the budget constraint linking the sources and uses of funds. For the tax-paying
firm, this can be written in terms of its end-of -period net debt as:
Bt+1 = Bt + P
I
t It +Dt − (1− τ)(Πt − rBt Bt)−Nt (1)
where B is the stock of debt, τ is the corporate tax rate, P I is the price of
investment goods (net of tax allowances), I is the volume of gross capital investment,
D is the dividend, Π is nominal profits, rB is the interest rate paid on corporate
debt, N is the value of new shares issued. This expression states that debt increases
when outlays on investment and dividends are greater than post-tax profits and the
proceeds from new share issues.
Collecting terms in the initial level of debt and dividing through by the beginning
of period capital stock leads to the following expression for corporate gearing:
bt+1 =
(1 + (1− τ)rBt )
(1 + g)
bt + dt − nt + it − (1− τ)πt (2)
where lower case letters denote shares of the capital stock and g is its nomi-
nal growth rate. This difference equation is dynamically unstable when the post
corporate tax interest rate (1 − τ)rBt is greater than the growth rate, g.1 In this
case, either dividends d, new issues n, investment i, or profitability π, need to vary
1The interest rate is greater than the growth rate in a dynamically efficient economy. While
tax deductibility may mean that (1− τ)rBt < g for tax-paying companies, this is unlikely to be the
case for tax exhausted companies and those who face a significant premium on their borrowing
costs.
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sufficiently to prevent the debt stock and gearing b, rising or falling without limit.
How these sources or uses of funds are actually used in balance sheet adjustment is
the subject of this paper.
In principle, at least under frictionless markets, balance sheet adjustment would
occur through the financial, rather than the real, decisions of firms. Firms already
maximising profits should not be able to increase the rate of profit in response
to balance sheet pressures. Moreover, in the absence of taxes, asymmetric in-
formation or agency problems, the Modigliani-Miller theorem would hold and the
optimal investment rate would be independent of financing considerations. Under
these conditions, the debt stock would need to be stabilised by changes in dividend
payments or new share issues even though this would not affect overall company
valuations. But, in practice, Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) find significant effects
of financial pressure on employment, wage growth and productivity and, by impli-
cation, profitability. While this paper focuses on the possible effects of financial
pressure on dividend payments, new share issues and investment, some compar-
isons are made between the size of these effects and those estimated by Nickell and
Nicolitsas (1999).
The process of balance sheet adjustment has been debated in both the finance
and tax literatures. The finance literature (Fama and French, 2000; Shyam-Sunder
and Myers, 1999) has contrasted the ‘trade-off’ with the ‘pecking-order’ models of
capital structure. According to the trade-off model, companies have an optimal
capital structure where they trade-off the tax benefits of increased indebtedness
against possible costs associated with the greater risk of insolvency. These costs
would include the direct costs of re-organisation in the event of insolvency as well
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as indirect costs that arise when companies get into financial difficulty (Barclay et
al, 1995, Myers, 2001). But, according to the pecking order model of Myers and
Majluf (1984) the theoretical benefits of achieving an optimum capital structure
are second-order when compared to the effects of asymmetric information between
insiders and outsiders in valuing companies. This leads to a situation where firms
prefer internal to external finance and, when external finance is needed, prefer debt
to equity. According to this pecking order approach, “each firm’s debt ratio...
reflects its cumulative requirement for external financing” (Myers, 2001). In effect,
the pecking-order predicts that corporate gearing should show no tendency to revert
to an equilibrium level. This is in direct contrast to the trade-off model where, by
(2), any desired capital structure would need to be brought about by varying one of
the variables on the right hand side. Under either of these views, capital investment
could be affected by financial considerations. With the trade-off model, investment
could be lower than otherwise when a company is attempting to reduce debt to
its optimal level (investment need not be affected since the adjustment could be
made by raising new equity). With the pecking order model, investment is lower
than otherwise when external finance is needed to fund it, reflecting a higher cost
of capital.
The tax literature has contrasted the ‘new view’ of dividend taxation developed
by Auerbach (1979) and King (1977) and reviewed by Auerbach (2001), which
claims that dividend taxation has no effect on corporate investment decisions, with
the ‘traditional view’ that dividend taxation imposes an additional tax wedge on
corporate investment. A critical prediction of the new view, according to Auerbach
and Hassett (2000) is that firms obtain their equity funds for investment through
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the retention of earnings, and distribute residual funds as dividends, rather than
using new equity as the marginal source of finance as in the traditional view. This
implies that dividends respond positively to cash flow and vary inversely with the
rate of investment. Auerbach and Hassett (2000) go on to suggest that dividends
might be sticky in the short-term, with short-term borrowing adjusting to meet
financing needs, but moving in the longer term to achieve an optimal debt-equity
ratio.
These different views of corporate finance and its relationship to capital invest-
ment have a number of different empirical implications. First, the trade-off model
predicts that corporate gearing varies over time to achieve a target level, suggesting
that gearing will be mean-reverting provided that the target itself is not changing
randomly over time. Second, in this model the target level of gearing will tend to
be higher for more profitable firms reflecting lower expected insolvency costs and
for firms with few other tax shields which may be associated with investment lev-
els (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). Third, both the new view and the trade-off
model predict that dividends would vary to bring about a desired capital structure,
implying a relationship between dividends and the level of indebtedness. Further-
more, the pecking order and new view tax model imply that dividends respond
positively to cash flow and negatively to rates of investment (Auerbach and Has-
sett, 2000). Fourth, under both pecking order and new view models, new equity
finance is seen as a last resort. This implies an inverse relationship between cash
flow and the propensity to issue new equity. Fifth, the models also imply a positive
relation between equity issuance and investment. The notion that companies use
equity issuance to adjust their balance sheet in response to high levels of gearing
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also implies that the propensity to issue equity responds positively to high levels
of gearing. Sixth, the Modigliani-Miller model predicts that capital investment is
unaffected by financial factors, while the pecking-order model and the new view
predict that investment is lower than otherwise when external finance is used to
fund it. These various empirical predictions are considered for the UK in the next
section.
The above discussion summarises some of the theoretical influences on corporate
financial and investment decisions and how they relate to balance sheet adjustment.
Our contribution is not to test between the different models but to quantify the scale
of the various effects, focusing on the implications for balance sheet adjustment.
3 Estimation and Results
3.1 Data Description
The data employed are derived from company accounts records held on Datastream,
the on-line service covering all companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange
(LSE). The data refer to non-financial companies over the period 1973 to 1998.
We select on a minimum number of four time-series observations per company.
The resulting total number of companies for which data on all variables (with the
exception of equity issuance) are available is 2,062. The number of company-year
observations is 22,095.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the key variables during different sub-
periods. The first eight rows refer to the dependent variables in our various models,
for dividends, investment, debt (gearing, either scaled by the replacement cost of
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capital stock, B/K, or by market capitalisation, B/MV ) and new equity issuance.
The proportion of companies issuing new equity considers whether this is issued
solely for cash or also in an acquisition and for two different threshold amounts.
For the new equity issuance (binary) outcomes, as well as any positive outcome we
also consider a threshold of two per cent of market capitalisation being issued as
new equity. Companies may issue some equity for reasons other than to finance
investment (eg. as part of their remuneration policies). The two per cent threshold
was employed by Auerbach and Hassett (2000) for this reason. The remaining
rows of Table 1 describe the data for the further explanatory variables used in our
analysis. These variables refer to cash flow (CF/K), the borrowing ratio term (br)
defined as the ratio of interest payments to profits favoured by Nickell and Nicolitsas
(1999) as a measure of financial pressure, Tobin’s Q (Q) as a measure of investment
opportunities facing the firm, real sales (S/P ) and sales relative to capital stock
(S/K).
Over the period, the mean ratio of dividends to sales is 0.020, with this company-
level mean increasing during the sample period from 0.014 in 1973-78 to 0.031 in
the 1994-98 period; clearly there is also a great deal of variation across companies.2
Around 37 per cent of company-year observations involve equity issuance, having
increased from 22 per cent during 1973-78 to 48 per cent in 1989-91 and exceeded
50 per cent in the 1984-88 period. The 2 per cent issuance threshold applies to 15
per cent of observations over the period. We also report figures for equity issuance
2Further data analysis of the distribution of dividend payments relative to com-
pany sales and company profits and how these distributions vary over time, is
provided in Benito and Young (2001).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA / DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 0209 9
for cash.3
The mean of the borrowing ratio, br, increases in the early 1980s and early 1990s
reflecting joint variation in the level of interest rates, debt and corporate profits.
Again, there is a large amount of variation across companies in this variable as
the standard deviation exceeds the mean in each period. Q averages 1.77 during
the period, increasing during the later periods; its distribution is positively skewed,
the median value being 1.04. High average values at the end of the period may
reflect an increase in the number of service sector companies whose value depends
on intangible capital. It is also worth noting that we measure Q at the end of
the calendar year in question whereas some other authors (Blundell et al, 1992)
measure it at the beginning of the accounting year.
Table 2 considers financial ‘regimes’ of companies in a particular year in the form
of whether a company pays a dividend and/or issues equity. Annual averages for the
different sub-periods are shown again separately for the any issuance and 2 per cent
threshold definitions for both all equity issued and equity issued for cash. Using
the 2 per cent issuance thresholds, the overwhelming majority of firms (around 80
per cent) are in the dividend payment, no equity issuance category. There has been
an increase in the proportion of firms issuing equity (see also Table 1) and this has
occurred amongst firms that also pay a dividend. In order to economise on the fixed
costs of issuance, companies should prefer to issue larger amounts of equity (itself
favouring larger companies) rather than repeatedly paying a dividend and issuing
equity in the same year. Table 3 considers the number of years that our 1,847
3This might appear to be a cleaner measure of the raising of funds for invest-
ment purposes but since our measure of investment includes merger and acquisition
activity, the case for excluding equity issued for acquisition is not unambiguous.
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companies on which we have share issuance data (or 1,751 companies in the case of
issuance for cash) both pay a dividend and issue 2 per cent equity in the same year.
The figures support the proposition that this is not a financial activity undertaken
repeatedly by the same companies. Bond and Meghir (1994) suggest the occurrence
of joint dividend payment and new share issuance may also reflect the existence of
transaction costs for trading equity and a signalling role for dividends. Around 2
per cent of firms neither pay a dividend nor issue (2 per cent) new equity. Less than
1 per cent of companies omit a dividend but issue new equity. (Table 2).
3.2 Estimation results
Our empirical strategy is to examine the behaviour of the level of dividends, in-
vestment and the use of new equity finance as functions of company financial char-
acteristics. Of key importance is the possible response of each of these to balance
sheet pressures as represented by measures of indebtedness or its servicing cost.
As such, the determinants of indebtedness are not modelled directly, instead they
can be recovered from the budget constraint, as represented by (2) and the esti-
mated behavioural relationships. The behavioural relationships that are estimated
for dividends and investment are as follows:
D
S it
= αi + α1
D
S it−1
+α2
CF
K it−1
+ α3brit−1 + α4
I
K it−1
(3)
+α5Qit−1 + α6
B
K it−1
+ α7 ln(S/P )it−1 + γDt + εDit
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IK it
= βi + β1
I
K it−1
+ β2Qit + β3Qit−1 + β4
S
K it
+ β4
S
K it−1
(4)
+β5
CF
K it
+ β6
CF
K it−1
+ β7brit + β8brit−1 + γIt + εIit
where the variable definitions follow those given above. αi and βi are the
company-specific fixed effects that control for time-invariant unobservables in the
dividends and investment equations, respectively. γDt and γIt denote common time
effects in the two equations with assumed serially uncorrelated error terms εDit and
εIit.
The specification for dividends, normalised on the cash value of company sales
following Bond et al (1996), encapsulates the salient features of the models referred
to in the previous section. This specification allows dividends to respond to cash
flow and investment with a possible role for debt. We also include investment op-
portunities proxied by a Tobin’s Q variable reflecting the demand for funds and
the log of real sales as a control variable for scale of the company capturing any
agency considerations or the volatility of cash flows. All right hand side variables
are lagged to reduce possible endogeneity. Our specification for investment is based
on that of Blundell et al (1992) supplemented by the financial pressure variable, br.4
All variables are included contemporaneously and with one lag. Both dividend and
investment equations allow for persistence through the inclusion of lagged depen-
4Recent investigations concerning the role of Q have highlighted the importance
of measurement error in Q and associated attenuation bias (Bond and Cummins,
2000; Erickson and Whited, 2000). To consider this point is beyond the scope of
this paper.
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dent variables. In the case of dividends, the persistence estimate, α1, is of special
interest following Lintner’s (1956) suggestion that companies are averse to cutting
the dividend, attempting to maintain it at a sustainable level. This would tend to
retard balance sheet adjustment through dividends.
For both equations we estimate dynamic fixed effects models using the GMM-
System estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and examined in detail by
Blundell and Bond (1998).5 This estimator is an extension of the GMM estimator
of Arellano and Bond (1991) and estimates equations in levels as well as in first-
differences. Where there is persistence in the data such that the lagged levels of
a variable are not highly correlated with the first difference, also estimating the
levels equations with a lagged difference term as an instrument can counter the
bias associated with weak instruments (see Blundell and Bond, 1998). The system
GMM estimator is a combination of the GMM differenced estimator and a GMM
levels estimator. Several variables display high levels of serial correlation. The
estimation method requires that there be evidence of significant negative first order
serial correlation in differenced residuals and no evidence of second order serial
correlation in the first differenced residuals. Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer (2000)
report Monte-Carlo evidence showing that when this method is used the Sargan test
of the overidentifying restrictions tends to over-reject, especially when the number
of observations per company is large.
For the new equity issuance decision, since the outcome we model is binary,
panel data probit models are estimated that incorporate a random effects term for
the company-specific unobservables (see Arulampalam, 1999 for discussion). The
5Our analysis therefore relaxes the assumptions of Fama and French (2000) and
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) that the regressors are strictly exogenous.
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specifications use the same explanatory variables as in the dividends equation except
that all variables are included contemporaneously.
These outcomes describe the possible mechanisms by which balance sheets are
adjusted. To verify that such adjustment occurs in practice, we estimate the speed
of debt adjustment in the reduced form, estimating a debt equation as a function
of its lagged value whilst also controlling for firm fixed effects and time effects.
3.2.1 Debt adjustment
We report results for a net rather than gross debt measure, (B − C), although
this does not make much difference to the results. This is scaled by either market
capitalisation (MV ) or replacement cost capital stock (K) in the results reported
in Table 4. The time effects control for the tax changes common across companies,
whilst the existence of company-specific target debt levels would be controlled for
through the fixed effects.
In all specifications, there is no evidence of second-order serial correlation in
the first-differenced residuals, the key requirement for our estimation strategy to be
valid. Nevertheless, the results using instruments dated from t−2 in the differenced
equation and at t − 1 in the levels equation are associated with significant values
for the Sargan test statistic. We therefore move to using deeper lags starting at
t− 3 in the differenced equation and t− 2 in the levels equation in columns 2 and
4. Under these estimates, the Sargan test statistic falls short of significance at the
10 per cent level for the capital gearing measure and we focus on these results.
The results indicate that the speed of adjustment of the level of debt is around
30 to 35 per cent per year, substantially faster than the rate of 7 to17 per cent
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per annum estimated in the US and described as “suspiciously slow” by Fama and
French (2000, p30). This indicates that companies actively adjust their balance
sheets to prevent levels of debt becoming excessive. The remainder of the paper
considers methods by which this adjustment may be achieved.
3.2.2 Dividends
Results for dividends are shown in Table 5. Support for the main predictions from
the previous discussion is obtained. Dividends respond positively to cash flow,
and negatively to levels of investment. These terms are highly significant, with
t-statistics (robust to heteroskedasticity) in excess of four. A further key feature of
the results is the degree of persistence in dividends. At 0.829 (0.129), the coefficient
(robust standard error) on the lagged dependent variable reveals a high level of
persistence indicating that companies are slow to adjust their balance sheets through
dividends.
The indebtedness term, B/K, is significantly negative. A high level of indebt-
edness restricts the amount companies tend to distribute to shareholders.6 This
is one of the channels by which the balance sheet is brought under control. The
dependence of dividends on the level of gearing partially offsets the effect of interest
payments in the debt accumulation process shown in (2).7
The Q term is signed positively, although not significantly, and this may reflect
6 In the results reported, we employ a gross debt variable and control for cash
flow separately. Using the net debt variable, ((B-C)/K) in a specification otherwise
equivalent to that in column 1 is associated with similar results with the debt term
again being significant but the cash flow term (CF/K) loses significance.
7When re-normalised on the capital stock, the coefficient on gearing is -0.03 in
the long run solution to the dividends equation.
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the fact that Q will in part pick up current profitability rather than purely op-
portunities for investment. Companies with a high value for Q may also feel more
confident about paying a higher dividend.
The scale term falls short of significance. This is likely to be because, in a fixed
effects model, it is the time-series variation that is being exploited; following an
increase in sales a given company may not reduce its dividend distributions in the
same way as a comparison between a small and large firm might imply.8 In column 2
we drop instruments dated t− 2 in the differenced equation and instruments dated
t− 1 in the levels equation; the main results described above remain intact.
In column 3 we consider the financial pressure variable br, (the ratio of interest
payments to profits) added to our previous regressor set. This is Nickell and Nicolit-
sas’s (1999) preferred measure of financial pressure facing a company. The analysis
of Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) looking at real outcomes such as employment, as
well as Fazzari et al’s (1988) analysis of investment, is predicated on the notion that
balance sheet adjustment through purely financial outcomes such as dividends or ex-
ternal finance is imperfect and some adjustment is necessary through real decisions
of the firm such as investment and employment.
In the context of dividends the results suggest that a role for the borrowing ratio
term depends upon the precise specification employed. In particular when included
alongside the cash flow and debt terms, the borrowing ratio is not significant. This
is not entirely surprising since the ‘br’ variable can be thought of as (rB/π) where
r is the effective rate of interest, B is the amount of debt and π is profits which is
8 In support of this, a pooled cross-sectional model, ie omitting the fixed effects,
results in a significantly positive coefficient on the lagged sales term (coefficient
(robust standard error) of 0.000251 (0.000094)).
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closely related to cash flow. Including the term alongside controls for cash flow and
debt is therefore asking rather a lot. It might seem preferable to consider a role for
the variable in place of the cash flow (CF/K) and debt (B/K) terms. This is done
in column 4 and the borrowing ratio variable is now on the margins of significance
with a ‘t-ratio’ of 1.85. This specification also omits the Q term since we believe
that in part picks up current profitability.
The impact of financial pressure can be quantified using the same experiment
as Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) by considering the impact on individual companies
of an increase in interest rates from 5 to 8 per cent.9 Under the assumption of
no fixed rate debt, this implies an increase in br of 60 per cent. Evaluated at the
means (br = 0.21; (D/S) = 0.021), the estimates imply a reduction in dividends of
3.1 per cent in the short-run and by 18.0 per cent in the long-run, but given the
high degree of persistence this takes a long time to come through. Recall that such
effects are quantitatively smaller and statistically insignificant when we control for
cash flow. For the same increase in financial pressure, Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999)
estimate a short-run (long-run) effect of 2.9 per cent (10 per cent) on employment;
2.3 per cent (2.5 per cent) on wages and a very small positive effect on productivity
of 0.5 per cent in the long-run. Balance sheet adjustment by dividends is therefore
quantitatively important but slow-acting.
Nevertheless, the fact that the financial pressure variable, br, is insignificant
when included alongside the cash flow and debt terms tells us something about the
best way to proxy financial pressure in this context. If we think of these specifica-
9Since such a change would have significant general equilibrium effects, this par-
tial experiment is best considered as a change in ‘financial pressure’ for an individual
company equivalent to a change in interest rates of this amount.
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tions as asking the data to ‘fight it out’ statistically as to which factor related to
financial pressure matters most, the results favour cash flow and debt rather than
the ratio of debt-servicing payments to profits.
In sum, although we can isolate a significant effect from the borrowing ratio
term, br, depressing levels of dividends, this requires the omission of the cash flow
and indebtedness terms. Where these terms are included jointly, the borrowing ratio
term loses its significance, whilst the cash flow and debt terms remain significant.
The cash flow and underlying indebtedness variables appear to do a sufficient job
of picking up any role for financial pressure type effects.
Within this preferred specification (column 2 of Table 5), dividends can be
thought of as adjusting gearing to a target level. This target level can be derived
from the estimated equation and depends positively on cash flow and negatively
on investment.10 The negative influence of investment on target gearing comes
about because this generates an alternative tax shield to debt and so reduces the
attractiveness of higher gearing under the new view and trade-offmodels. Under the
pecking order model, there is no well-defined target level. But an inverse relation
between gearing (or its long-run solution) and investment could come about under
a more complex version of this model if firms are concerned with both current
and future financing costs and higher investment levels encourage firms to maintain
debt capacity rather than forego future investments or using costly equity to finance
them. The positive effect of cash flow on target gearing reflects the lower probability
10The dividend equation can be written explicitly as a means of debt adjustment
dt = λ0dt−1+λ1(bt−1−b∗t−1) and variables other than dividends and debt interpreted
as driving the target gearing level, b∗.
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and expected cost of insolvency under the trade-off approach. It is not consistent
with the pecking order model, where higher profitability reduces gearing.
3.2.3 New Equity Issues
Under the pecking order model, companies are generally averse to new equity finance
because of information asymmetries, using it when investment is high relative to
cash flow. Under the new view, incentives to issue equity are dependent on taxes.
In the UK, at least until 1997, the tax system encouraged new equity issues (Benito
and Young, 2001), although this may have been offset by transactions costs, which
are likely to be larger for smaller firms. Under the trade-off model, new equity issues
would be more likely when gearing is above its target level. Taking these views into
account would suggest that new equity issues are used when investment is strong
relative to cash flow and when gearing is high, with possible effects depending on
firm size.
Carpenter and Petersen (2002) emphasise that the literature examining the fi-
nancing and investment decisions has tended to focus on debt finance with the role
of new equity finance being largely neglected. They present descriptive statistics of
a set of US (technology-based) firms. Our analysis of the propensity for firms to
issue new equity can be motivated by similar concerns but adopts a more formal ap-
proach. Table 6 presents results for the estimation of random effects probit models
for share issuance. Again, we consider the propensity to issue new equity finance as
a function of cash flow (CF/K), investment (I/K), Tobin’s Q (Q) as a proxy for
investment opportunities, and debt (B/K). We also include a control for scale (log
real sales, S/P ). A role for the financial pressure variable (br) is also considered.
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Note that data on new equity issues are available for a slightly restricted period, so
our sample periods are restricted accordingly.
A key result is that the cash flow term (CF/K) is highly significant and nega-
tively signed. As predicted by the pecking order and new view models, companies
with high levels of cash flow are less likely to resort to equity issues to finance
investment since the availability of internal funds reduces their need to resort to
external equity finance. The likelihood of using new equity finance increases signif-
icantly in the level of debt (B/K) and rate of investment (I/K) of the firm. The
former is consistent with the notion that companies have a target gearing level,
with equity issuance being one response to excessive levels of debt. The positive
relation between propensity to issue equity and rate of investment is as expected,
reflecting the fact that equity finance will tend to be used more by those companies
with substantial investment programmes.
The results also suggest that larger firms are more likely to use equity finance
than smaller firms controlling for these other financial characteristics and this may
reflect fixed costs of issuance. The Q term is also highly significant and suggests
that firms with higher investment opportunities are more likely to use new equity
finance. It could also be that managers of high Q firms think that the shares are
over-valued and are issuing more to benefit the existing shareholders. Note also that
the estimate of the parameter ρ, which reflects the proportion of the total variance
accounted for by the unobserved heterogeneity term, is approximately 0.22 (in the
2 per cent issuance threshold model) and is well-determined.
In the equation that considers any equity issued as the dependent variable,
the debt term (B/K) is insignificant. Redefining the dependent variable to equity
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issuance of 2 per cent of market capitalisation alters this result, with the results
indicating that in this case, a high level of debt increases the probability of equity
issuance. With the exception of this result for the debt term, the other results are
not sensitive to specifying the dependent variable using a zero versus 2 per cent
threshold for equity issues.
The addition of the financial pressure variable, br, indicates that this is not
significant. Instead, equity issuance responds as anticipated to the underlying in-
debtedness of the company (B/K) and its cash flow (CF/K), rather than a term
reflecting the flow of interest payments on debt relative to profits. This suggests
equity issues are related to more fundamental aspects of indebtedness rather than
the short-term financial pressure associated with its servicing. This is consistent
with the notion that equity issues are used for more ‘low frequency’ movements in
the target debt-equity ratio with companies perhaps using short-term borrowing to
smooth variations in its debt-equity ratio at higher frequencies.
It is clear from Table 6 that the results for equity issuance for cash are very
similar to those reported above for cash and acquisition-related issuance. Each of
the coefficients attracts the same sign and similar level of significance.
How important, quantitatively, is each variable? Table 7 presents the marginal
effects, evaluated at the means. These effects indicate the change in the probability
of observing an equity issue for a 1-unit change in the explanatory variable holding
constant the other factors, evaluated at the means. These calculations employ
the correction recommended by Arulampalam (1999) for the normalisation in the
coefficient estimates present in random effects probit models. The use of the 2 per
cent issuance threshold reduces the quantitative importance of each variable (with
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the exception of the debt term, B/K). The marginal effects indicate that a 10
percentage point increase in cash flow, lowers the probability of issuing equity by
0.02 (-0.171/10). Recall that the mean company cash flow is 0.26 and the mean
proportion of companies issuing equity is 0.37 with the proportion issuing equity to
the value of 2 per cent of market capitalisation or more being 0.15. A change in the
probability of this order is by no means small. The probability of equity issuance is
more sensitive to investment. A 10 percentage point increase in investment raises
the probability of new equity issuance by 0.04 under both the zero and 2 per cent
issuance threshold results. The marginal effect for Q indicates that an increase in
Q of 0.1 (the mean value being 1.70) increases the probability of equity issuance
by 0.003. The model for a 2 per cent threshold for equity issuance indicated a
significant relation between the propensity to issue equity and the amount of debt.
Under these estimates an increase in debt of 10 percentage points is associated with
an increase in the probability of 0.004.
3.2.4 Investment
The paper thus far has concentrated on the financial policies of UK firms. We now
consider the real side of the balance sheet in the form of levels of investment. This
follows a large number of previous studies (see Hubbard, 1998, for a review). Our
contribution in presenting these results is first, to present these models in the context
of the wider financing decisions of UK corporates estimated above and second, to
consider the potential role of the financial pressure variable, br, in a UK firm-level
study of fixed investment for the first time.
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We begin our results with estimates for a basic Q model without financial vari-
ables, presented in column 1 of Table 8. The results accord with our priors. Invest-
ment responds positively to the value of Q at the beginning of period (dated t− 1)
with a t-value of 5.7. As in Blundell et al (1992) there is a significantly negative
coefficient on the contemporaneous sales to capital ratio, (S/K) and positive coeffi-
cient on the lagged value. Columns 2 to 5 are again conservative in their definition
of the instruments selecting these from t− 3 in the difference equation and t− 2 in
the levels equation, though this does not materially affect our results, the standard
errors on some terms increasing slightly.11
Column 3 adds cash flow terms and we find a significantly positive effect, sup-
porting models where internally generated funds are the cheapest source of finance
to the firm.12 While this is consistent with the financial constraints literature, the
11Here, the Sargan test typically returns a value in excess of the standard critical
value, although the M2 statistic indicates the key condition for the validity of this
method holds. We use conservative definitions of the instruments to help counter the
possibility of invalid instruments. As we note above, Blundell et al (2000) report
that the Sargan test over-rejects when the data are persistent and the number of
time series observations is large.
12Several studies have considered whether these cash flow effects are greater for
certain types of firms which are more likely to be financially constrained (eg. Bond
and Meghir, 1994). We therefore interacted the cash flow terms with indicators
for dividend omission, omission but former dividend payment and smaller scale (in
the bottom quartile of the sales distribution). Considered alternately, these terms
(contemporaneous and lagged) were individually and jointly insignificant. Recently,
debate has focused on whether these indicators instead proxy the types of firms for
which market information and the Tobin’s Q variable is likely to be more imperfect
such that cash flow effects may proxy investment opportunities (eg. Alti, 2001).
For this reason and given the insignificance of such interaction terms, we do not
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importance of cash flow could reflect other factors. For example if current cash
flow is correlated with future profitability it could simply reflect an improvement
in prospects. The inclusion of cash flow terms lowers the significance of the lagged
Q, suggesting perhaps that both serve as indicators of future prospects. In column
4 the borrowing ratio term is considered as a financial variable (omitting the cash
flow term) with the terms being significant and negatively signed. This suggests
that the financial pressure of debt servicing plays an important role in influenc-
ing investment levels of firms. This extends the results of Nickell and Nicolitsas
(1999) who consider a role for this variable in the employment, wage growth and
productivity levels of UK firms. Real outcomes at the firm-level respond to the
financial pressure effects whilst above we found that purely financial variables such
as dividends and equity issuance were not responsive to this variable, instead be-
ing affected by longer-term notions of indebtedness of the firm. Moreover, adding
the cash flow terms in column 5, the borrowing ratio variable remains significant,
the lagged variable having a ‘t-ratio’ of -3.40, with the cash flow terms also being
significant. This provides strong evidence in favour of a financial pressure effect on
investment at the company-level, at least in the short-term and is another of our
key results.
The addition of a debt term, when controlling for cash flow does not improve
on this model in column 5. The debt term, B/K, in such a specification falls short
of significance when entered in place of the borrowing ratio term, with a t-ratio on
the B/Kit term of -1.27.
discuss these results in detail.
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The results for a change in investment associated with a given change in financial
pressure may again be derived and compared to those of Nickell and Nicolitsas
(1999) for other company outcomes. For a change in financial pressure equivalent
to a permanent increase in the interest rate from 5 to 8 per cent, the estimates in
column 4 imply a 5.7 per cent reduction in investment in the short-run and 13.5
per cent reduction in the long-run. Under the estimates in column 5 (controlling
for cash-flow) the results imply a 2.3 per cent short-run and 11.4 per cent long-run
effect, evaluated at the means. This compares to the short-run (long-run) impact
on dividends of 3.1 (18.0) per cent, when not controlling for cash flow (the effect
being insignificant when controlling for cash-flow). Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999)
found an impact on employment of 2.9 per cent in the short-run and 10 per cent in
the long-run, with smaller offsetting on wages and productivity.
4 Conclusions
This paper has examined methods of balance sheet adjustment of UK firms and the
forces to which such adjustments respond. A special emphasis has been placed on
adjustment in response to financial pressure. In this context, we have considered
debt adjustment, levels of dividend payment, the propensity to issue new equity
and rates of investment using company-level data.
The analysis has produced novel results in several respects. First, our analysis
of dividends identifies a number of influences. Dividends respond positively to cash
flows and negatively to rates of investment for UK firms, in a manner consistent with
the new view approach (Auerbach, 2001) and pecking order models. The new view
model of taxation and corporate finance which bases a hierarchy of funds on tax
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discrimination has important implications for the design of tax policy. Dividends are
also negatively influenced by the level of indebtedness of the company. This result
highlights the use of dividends as an adjustment mechanism to maintain gearing on
a sustainable path.
Second, we find large persistence effects in levels of dividends, with coefficients
on the lagged dependent variable in our models in excess of 0.8. Companies are slow
to adjust their balance sheets through their dividend payment. Thus, in response
to some financial shock companies will use other means in the short-term to adjust
their balance sheets in addition to that through the level of dividend distributed to
shareholders.
This analysis of the role of dividend adjustment is important for wider reasons.
A large literature has developed examining how investment is affected by cash flow
in a manner consistent with financial constraints (eg. Fazzari et al (1988)). This
literature, and its macroeconomic analogue, that of the financial accelerator (eg
Bernanke et al, 1996), has neglected the potential role of dividend adjustment in
such a process. The emphasis instead has been on the notion that companies will
need to resort to external finance which, if available only at a cost premium over
internal funds, will imply that companies will forego investment opportunities fol-
lowing a shock to cash flow. Since dividend adjustment potentially offers an alter-
native means of making such funds available, our analysis has attempted to make
clear this potential role whilst also illustrating why in practice they may not be
adjusted immediately in response to such pressures. That is, the high degree of
persistence in dividend payments that we find may reflect large adjustment costs
perhaps associated with a signalling role for dividends. This then makes other
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forms of adjustment, such as external finance and/or deferred real investment levels
preferable to the firms involved.
Third, we have considered external finance through the propensity for companies
to issue additional equity. We have shown that companies do not generally pay a
dividend and issue new equity in the same year, or at least not on an ongoing basis.
Further, companies with low levels of cash flow, high levels of debt and in particular,
high levels of investment are more likely to issue equity. Our analysis of each of
these outcomes, dividends, equity issuance and investment has considered the role
of the financial burden of debt-servicing. We thereby extend the analysis of Nickell
and Nicolitsas (1999) of how financial pressure affects companies. In this context,
our results for the different outcomes produced an interesting contrast. Evidence
was found to support the notion that debt-servicing costs affect the real outcome
of investment whereas we were unable to isolate a significant effect of this financial
pressure variable on the level of dividend (when controlling for cash flow) or the
propensity to issue equity. These latter outcomes instead respond more clearly to
cash flow and longer-term measures of indebtedness of the firm.
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Table 1: Summary stat ist ics
1973-
78
1979-
83
1984-
88
1989-
93
1994-
98
(D/ S) Dividends 0.014 (0.015) 0.016 (0.021) 0.020 (0.031) 0.026 (0.022) 0.031 (0.034)
(I / K ) Invest ment 0.155 (0.159) 0.142 (0.160) 0.201 (0.235) 0.186 (0.226) 0.164 (0.187)
(B/ K ) Gearing 0.141 (0.234) 0.110 (0.173) 0.152 (0.299) 0.197 (0.317) 0.237 (0.602)
(B/ MV ) Gearing 0.425 (1.749) 0.360 (2.737) 0.184 (1.431) 0.204 (0.898) 0.214 (1.440)
(N/ M V ) > 0 New Equity 0.220 0.304 0.523 0.637 n.a.
(N/MV) ‡ 0.02 New Equity 0.125 0.123 0.205 0.201 n.a.
(Nc/MV) > 0 Issuance for cash n.a. 0.231 0.394 0.614 0.720
(Nc/MV)   ‡ 0.02 Issuance for cash n.a. 0.061 0.087 0.128 0.103
(CF/K) Cash flow 0.236 (0.184) 0.178 (0.157) 0.290 (0.292) 0.302 (0.287) 0.327 (0.310)
br Borrowing ratio 0.167 (0.192) 0.272 (0.301) 0.197 (0.227) 0.249 (0.274) 0.160 (0.194)
Q Tobin’s Q 0.870 (0.968) 1.011 (1.433) 2.160 (2.518) 2.168 (2.252) 2.835 (3.089)
(S/K) Sales/capital 3.846 (5.812) 3.321 (3.630) 3.723 (3.982) 3.830 (4.910) 4.195 (6.196)
S Sales 269.4 (1164.3) 330.6 (1588.0) 437.1 (2009.1) 467.0 (1826.3) 495.5 (1836.3)
Observations 6162 4653 3955 3880 3445
Note: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses, where applicable). Equity
issuance, N, data end in 1991. Equity issuance for cash, Nc, is only available
from 1981. The variables (N/MV) > p indicate the proportion of company-year
observations with equity issuance greater than p. See Data Appendix for variable
definitions.
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Table 2: Dividend Payment and New Equity
1973-78 1979-83 1984-88 1989-93 1994-98
For cash and acquisition
Any issuance
D=1 & N=0 0.763 0.677 0.460 0.343 n.a.
D=0 & N=0 0.017 0.019 0.017 0.020 n.a.
D=1 & N=1 0.217 0.301 0.516 0.628 n.a.
D=0 & N=1 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.009 n.a.
2 per cent issuance
D=1 & N=0 0.857 0.856 0.776 0.776 n.a.
D=0 & N=0 0.018 0.020 0.019 0.024 n.a.
D=1 & N=1 0.124 0.122 0.200 0.195 n.a.
D=0 & N=1 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.006 n.a.
For Cash
Any issuance
D=1 & N=0 n.a. 0.745 0.588 0.358 0.267
D=0 & N=0 n.a. 0.024 0.019 0.027 0.013
D=1 & N=1 n.a. 0.229 0.389 0.605 0.711
D=0 & N=1 n.a. 0.002 0.005 0.009 0.009
2 per cent issuance
D=1 & N=0 n.a. 0.914 0.892 0.839 0.878
D=0 & N=0 n.a. 0.025 0.020 0.032 0.019
D=1 & N=1 n.a. 0.060 0.084 0.124 0.101
D=0 & N=1 n.a. 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003
Note: D refers to a dividend payment; N is new equity for cash or acquisition
(any issuance or to the value of 2 per cent of market capitalisation); Nc is new
equity for cash.
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Table 3: New Equity Issues and Dividend Payments
No of years a company pays a dividend
and issues 2% equity in the same year.
Issuance for cash or
acquisition
Issuance for cash
Number per cent Number per cent
0 791 42.8 1,014 57.9
1 459 24.9 398 22.7
2 223 12.1 204 11.7
3 139 7.5 75 4.3
4 95 5.1 38 2.2
5 59 3.2 15 0.9
6 36 2.0 5 0.3
7 21 1.1 2 0.1
8 15 0.8 0 0.0
9 to 12 9 0.5 0 0.0
1,847 100.0 1,751 100.0
Table 4: Debt adjustment
[1] [2] [3] [4]
(B-C)/MV (B-C)/K
(B-C)/MVit−1 0.612 (0.135) 0.641 (0.098)
(B-C)/Kit−1 0.610 (0.091) 0.727 (0.059)
Year effects yes yes yes yes
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
Instruments t-2..t-5; ∆t-1 t-3..t-5; ∆t-2 t-2..t-5; ∆t-1 t-3..t-5; ∆t-2
M1 -1.94; p=0.00 -2.21; p=0.00 -5.76; p=0.00 -6.33; p=0.00
M2 0.72; p=0.47 0.70; p=0.49 1.24; p=0.21 1.22; p=0.23
Firms 2,062 2,062 2,062 2,062
Observations 22,033 22,033 22,033 22,033
Notes: Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step
method (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998). Sargan is a Sar-
gan Test of over-identifying restrictions. Mj is a test of jth order serial correlation
in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed N(0,1). Asymptotic ro-
bust standard errors reported in parentheses. In columns 1 and 3 instruments are
(B-C)/MVit−2 to (B-C)/MVit−5 in the differenced equations and ∆(B-C)/MVit−1
in the levels equation. In columns 2 and 4 instruments are (B-C)/MVit−3 to (B-
C)/MVit−5 in the differenced equations and∆(B-C)/MVit−2 in the levels equation.
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Table 5: Dividends
(D/S)it [1] [2] [3] [4]
(D/S)it−1 0.829 (0.129) 0.835 (0.127) 0.826 (0.134) 0.829 (0.140)
(CF/K)it−1 0.623 (0.155) 0.559 (0.242) 0.558 (0.229)
brit−1 -0.229 (0.282) -0.538 (0.292)
(I/K)it−1 -0.533 (0.110) -0.750 (0.367) -0.949 (0.383) -0.562 (0.327)
Qit−1 0.024 (0.018) 0.055 (0.040) 0.058 (0.041)
(B/K)it−1 -0.209 (0.100) -0.127 (0.068) -0.112 (0.064)
ln(S)it−1 -0.082 (0.059) -0.112 (0.066) -0.106 (0.064) -0.134 (0.084)
Year effects yes yes yes yes
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
Instruments t-2..t-5; ∆t-1 t-3..t-5; ∆t-2 t-3..t-5; ∆t-2 t-3..t-5; ∆t-2
M1 -3.64; p=0.00 -3.69; p=0.00 -3.69; p=0.00 -3.67; p=0.00
M2 1.43; p=0.15 1.45; p=0.15 1.46; p=0.15 1.44; p=0.15
Firms 2,062 2,062 2,062 2,062
Observations 22,033 22,033 22,033 22,033
Notes: Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step
method (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998). Sargan is a Sar-
gan Test of over-identifying restrictions. Mj is a test of jth order serial correlation
in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed N(0,1). Asymptotic ro-
bust standard errors reported in parentheses. Instruments as stated. Coefficients
and standard errors multiplied by 100, with the exception of those associated with
the lagged dependent variable.
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Table 6: New Equity Issuance
Issuance for cash or acquisition Issuance for cash
any 2 per cent any 2 per cent
(CF/K)it -0.648 (0.118) -0.816 (0.109) -0.704 (0.113) -0.736 (0.107)
brit -0.010 (0.072) 0.096 (0.077)
(I/K)it 1.602 (0.088) 2.238 (0.080) 2.011 (0.073) 0.842 (0.082) 1.560 (0.074) 1.379 (0.069)
Qit 0.118 (0.015) 0.098 (0.013) 0.026 (0.010) 0.156 (0.013) 0.082 (0.011) 0.024 (0.008)
(B/K)it -0.011 (0.069) 0.211 (0.057) 0.252 (0.059) -0.093 (0.052) 0.110 (0.036) 0.108 (0.036)
ln(S)it 0.414 (0.016) 0.154 (0.012) 0.157 (0.012) 0.416 (0.016) 0.069 (0.011) 0.072 (0.012)
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
log-likelihood -7635.775 -6199.427 -6228.284 -6434.336 -3953.979 -3978.161
Sa 0.941 (0.028) 0.534 (0.024) 0.546 (0.024) 0.920 (0.030) 0.405 (0.030) 0.406 (0.030)
r 0.469 (0.015) 0.222 (0.015) 0.229 (0.015) 0.458 (0.016) 0.141 (0.018) 0.141 (0.018)
Firms 1,847 1,847 1,847 1,751 1,751 1,751
Observations 17,091 17,091 17,091 17,091 17,091 17,091
Notes : Maximum likelihood estimates for random effects probit model are shown. Standard errors in parentheses.
r  is the proportion of the total variance that is accounted for by the company-specific component.
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Table 7: Marginal Effects for New Equity Issuance
any 2 percent
For cash or acquisition
(CF/K)it -0.171 -0.153
brit 0.002
(I/K)it 0.423 0.419 0.376
Qit 0.031 0.018 0.005
(B/K)it -0.003 0.040 0.047
ln(S)it 0.109 0.029 0.029
For cash
(CF/K)it -0.207 -0.105
brit 0.014
(I/K)it 0.247 0.222 0.198
Qit 0.046 0.012 0.003
(B/K)it -0.027 0.016 0.016
ln(S)it 0.122 0.010 0.010
Note: The table reports marginal effects of a unit change on the probability
of observing yit=1 evaluated at the means. The marginal effects are calculated as
d[prob(y=1|x)]
dxk
= φ
¡
xβ
√
1− ρ
¢ ¡√
1− ρβk
¢
where φ (·) is the standard normal density
function, x is the vector of mean characteristics, β the vector of coefficient esti-
mates with βk the coefficient estimate on regressor xk (see Arulampalam (1999)
on the adjustment to the standard expression for marginal effects by the
p
(1− ρ)
correction factor in a random effects probit model).
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Table 8: Investment
(I/K)it [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
(I/K)it−1 0.139 (0.015) 0.148 (0.050) 0.236 (0.049) 0.083 (0.047) 0.178 (0.048)
Qit -0.003 (0.006) -0.007 (0.006) -0.010 (0.006) -0.010 (0.006) -0.012 (0.005)
Qit−1 0.034 (0.006) 0.033 (0.007) 0.010 (0.006) 0.032 (0.063) 0.012 (0.005)
(S/K)it -0.014 (0.003) -0.014 (0.005) -0.021 (0.005) -0.014 (0.004) -0.021 (0.005)
(S/K)it−1 0.013 (0.003) 0.013 (0.004) 0.016 (0.004) 0.014 (0.004) 0.017 (0.004)
(CF/K)it 0.423 (0.077) 0.407 (0.079)
(CF/K)it−1 -0.151 (0.060) -0.172 (0.059)
brit -0.079 (0.041) -0.032 (0.041)
brit−1 -0.093 (0.030) -0.098 (0.029)
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes
Sargan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Instruments t-2..t-5; ∆t-1 t-3..t-5; ∆t-2 t-3..t-5; ∆t-2 t-3..t-5; ∆t-2 t-3..t-5; ∆t-2
M1 -17.50; p=0.00 -9.83; p=0.00 -10.64; p=0.00 -9.70; p=0.00 -3.67; p=0.00
M2 1.02; p=0.31 0.62; p=0.54 1.58; p=0.12 -0.18; p=0.86 1.44; p=0.15
Firms 2,062 2,062 2,062 2,062 2,062
Observations 22,033 22,033 22,033 22,033 20,033
Notes: Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step
method (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998). Sargan is a Sar-
gan Test of over-identifying restrictions. Mj is a test of jth order serial correlation
in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed N(0,1). Asymptotic
robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Data Appendix
Panel Structure
Table A.1 tabulates the number of time-series observations per company.
Table A.1: Panel structure
No of records 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Companies 254 187 143 185 203 154 132 102 90 94 74 59
No of records 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Total
Companies 50 32 30 40 16 12 22 26 19 26 112 2,026
Variable Construction
Dividends (D)
Ordinary dividends net of Advance Corporation Tax. (Datastream Item 187)
Debt (B/K)
Total loan capital (DS321) divided by replacement cost of capital stock K (see be-
low) or market capitalisation (MV). Net debt subtracts cash and equivalent (DS375)
from the numerator.
Leverage (B/MV)
Total loan capital (DS321) divided by market capitalisation of the company
(Item mv).
Equity issued (N)
Two definitions of equity issuance are used. Equity issued for cash (DS412) and
equity issued for cash and acquisition (DS406). The former is only available up to
1991 whilst the latter is available from 1981 and both before and after the intro-
duction of the cashflow standard FSR1 and FRS1(Rev) which became compulsory
in March 1992. Both figures are net of share repurchases.
Investment (I/K)
Owing to changes in company accounts definitions in 1991, a different method
for calculation is used pre- and post-1991. Up to 1991, investment is calculated as
Total new fixed assets (DS435) less sales of fixed assets (DS423). From 1991, this
is calculated as total payments for fixed assets of the parent (DS1026) plus those of
any subsidiaries (DS429), net of sales of fixed assets.
Capital stock (K)
Capital stock is measured on a replacement cost basis. The procedure employed
uses a perpetual inventory method as has been used in a number of company ac-
counts panel data studies (eg. Blundell et al., (1992)). Kt+1 = Kit(1 − δ) + Iit
where δ is the rate of depreciation assumed to be 0.08. I is investment. For the
company’s first observation, the replacement cost is assumed equal to the historic
cost total net fixed assets (DS339), adjusted for inflation.
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Tobin’s Q (Q)
Q =
¡
mv+B−C
K
¢
where mv is market capitalisation of the company at December 31 in year t
(Datastream Item mv); B is book value of outstanding debt (DS321); C is book
value of cash and equivalent (DS375). The top 1 per cent of values are recoded to
the 99th percentile.
Cash flow (CF)
Profit after tax and preference dividends (DS186) plus depreciation of fixed
assets (DS136).
Borrowing ratio (br)
Interest payments (DS153) divided by profit before tax (DS157) plus interest
received (DS143). Where companies have a negative value for the denominator
their borrowing ratio is set equal to 1.
Real Sales (S/P)
Total company sales S (DS104), deflated by the GDP deflator (P ).
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